Neocon Blues

Eric Reeves rightfully gripes about U.S. special presidential envoy for Sudan Scott Gration, who oddly thinks it’s appropriate now for America to normalize relations with Khartoum:

More troubling, Gration has said too little about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the consequences of Khartoum’s March 4 expulsion of 13 key international humanitarian organizations; he has demonstrated little appreciation for what was lost, and the difficulty in generating new capacity. Stop-gap measures are beginning to fail at the height of the rainy season, and a number of camps report grave health and sanitation crises.

Gration also appears excessively optimistic about the moribund Darfur peace process. He repeatedly declared to Darfuris and humanitarians during a recent trip to the region that peace in Darfur would be achieved by the end of this year. But any meaningful peace agreement will first require an effective cease-fire, with robust monitoring of a sort that cannot be provided by the current UN/African Union peacekeeping force, which is badly underequipped, undermanned, and has lost the confidence of most Darfuris.

Humanitarians were dismayed at Gration’s insistent talk about the “voluntary’’ return of some 2.7 million displaced persons languishing in camps throughout Darfur. There is no humanitarian capacity to oversee such returns and ensure their voluntary nature; Khartoum refuses to provide security in areas it controls; and Darfuris in the camps complain bitterly that they are being asked to return to lands without protection, and which have oftentimes been taken over by Arab tribal groups. The notorious Janjaweed have not been disarmed and pose a constant threat. Even in the camps themselves, security is tenuous; women still face rape, men are tortured and murdered, and looting is commonplace. In the past, it has been Khartoum that has pushed for returns under these conditions; now, perversely, it is the US special envoy.

In his Senate testimony, Gration suggests that his travels to Cairo and Beijing enabled him to meet “leaders who share our common concern and want to work together toward shared objectives.’’ This ignores the long and resolutely obstructionist role both Egypt and China have played in Sudan over many years. Shortly after Gration’s testimony, a senior Egyptian official described Darfur as an “artificial’’ crisis directed against the people of Sudan. Beijing’s continued shipment of advanced weaponry to Khartoum; its opposition to the role of the International Criminal Court in pursuing atrocity crimes in Darfur; and its relentless support of Khartoum at the Security Council leave one wondering what Gration means by “common concern.’’

The highlighted portion makes me wonder if there isn’t anything exceptional to Gration’s overseas experience. Maybe he was wined and dined by some charismatic regime stooges. Maybe he was bribed. I don’t know. But there’s a less paranoid and still plausible theory: Gration is a victim of diplomatic hubris. It’s all too easy for diplomats to think their social interactions with international leaders will have a larger-than-life effect and buck the trends of whatever regime they’re engaging. After all, when your day-to-day job humanizes the very faces of evil, it’s easy to see a silver lining in the characters of people who are probably just out to get theirs and retain power. Maybe Gration is truly deluded by this hubris that he thinks whatever positive interactions he had with the Sudanese charm offensive will, in fact, produce the ever elusive peace.

This hubris isn’t limited to just diplomats. Obama is arguably convinced the power of his own words and charisma will buck the trend of failed quartet initiatives when it comes to Iran; George W. Bush probably took that gaze into “Putin’s soul” a little too personally. The great man theory of history is very appealing, and there are times when it truly explains major events, but we can’t all be great men.